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Abstract
We study two aspects of globalization. It allows a decision-maker to go beyond his
own local experience and to learn from other decision-makers in addressing common
problems. This improves the identication and di¤usion of best practices. It also
provides extra information to markets that evaluate decision-makers: comparisons
become possible. We identify conditions under which the globalization of markets helps
or hurts (i) the communication among decision-makers about their own experience and
(ii) the quality of the decision that is taken next. An important mediating factor is
whether decision-making is centralized or decentralized.
Keywords: centralization, decentralization, learning, cheap talk, reputational con-
cerns, globalization, policy di¤usion
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1 Introduction
Many things can be done in di¤erent ways. Managers can motivate employees in di¤erent
ways. Dentists can resolve tooth root infections in di¤erent ways. Teachers can teach children
arithmetic in di¤erent ways. The list is virtually endless. In many areas, it is a blessing
that alternative solutions to a problem exist. It enables one to e¤ectively match a solution
with the exact problem. In other areas, matching is less of an issue. In those cases a best
solution, or best practice, may exist. The challenge then is to recognize the best practice
and to ensure its di¤usion.
The identication and di¤usion of best practices raise two main problems. First, informa-
tion about di¤erent practices is often dispersed. The reason is that users (teachers, doctors,
politicians) usually have experience with a limited number of practices. The implication is
that the search for the best practice requires communication. Second, users may identify
themselves with a particular practice. Identication is likely in situations where a user is
held responsible for the selection of the proper practice. A user may then be reluctant to
switch to another practice out of fear of being perceived as somebody who initially selected
the wrong one. Such reputational concerns may obstruct di¤usion of best practices. In
the present paper we address the question how features of the learning process determine
the quality of communication about the performance of locally adopted practices and the
di¤usion of best practices. We compare a decentralized and a centralized process. In a de-
centralized process, users communicate with each other about their experiences (horizontal
communication). Next, each user makes his own decision regarding the practice to use. In a
centralized decision process, users of practices communicate with a central authority (verti-
cal communication), and the central authority chooses the practice the users have to adopt
next.
The following two examples illustrate that the above mentioned problems as to the identi-
cation and di¤usion of best practices are real-world problems. First, the delivery of medical
interventions varies widely from place to place.1 This variation has been a source of wor-
ries as, most likely, some patients do not receive optimal treatment.2 It also o¤ers scope
1That variation is large is a well-established fact, see Phelps (2000).
2See, e.g., Eddy (1990).
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for learning. In response, physiciansassociations and health care authorities have exerted
much e¤ort to design learning processes in which locally gained experiences are compared,
and best practices interventions, surgical procedures, drug use di¤used. In the medical
sector, expert panels are frequently used to evaluate the evidence on the e¤ectiveness of
rival practices in a given eld. Given the close ties between experts and industry, and the
long gestation period that characterizes the development of practices, experts tend to have
vested interests and to identify with certain practices. The result, according to students of
expert panels, is process loss due to status concerns and social pressure, meaning poor
information exchange and aggregation in the meetings, and a low adoption rate of best prac-
tices afterwards.3 Organizing these panels is therefore fraught with problems. An important
organizational dimension is the degree of centralization of the process and, relatedly, the
degree of freedom individual physicians have in following the outcomes of panel meetings.4
The European Union is another case in point. It has been promoting the so-called open
method of coordination (OMC) to foster learning and the di¤usion of best practices in
many policy areas. The hope is that goals like EU competitiveness can be furthered by
avoiding the grand questions about the best model for Europe and by taking instead a more
pragmatic micro-orientation in which countries that face similar problems seek to learn from
each other. Rather than relying on legislation by Brussels, the OMC leaves more freedom
to member states to implement the lessons learned. Moreover, instead of applying formal
sanctions to transgressors, the OMC turns to naming and shaming to expose a countrys weak
performance in public, and applies peer pressure if a country opposes adoption of superior
policies.5 In practice, the method is not considered to be very successful in guaranteeing a
high quality learning process. It is generally felt that countries exaggerate the success of their
current practices. The implementation of new ideas is very limited. Claudio Radaelli (2003,
p. 12), a political scientist, argues that these disappointing results stem from a misguided
view of policy makers among the proponents of the OMC. Rather than caring about the
truth, they care about political capital and prestige.
Both the example of the medical sector and the example of the European Union make
3See Fink et al. (1984) and Rowe et al. (1991).
4Eddy (1990) distinguishes, in increasing degree of freedom, standards, guidelines, and options.
5See Pochet (2005) and Radaelli (2003).
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clear that the identication and di¤usion of best practices require communication, and that
learning may be hampered by reputational or career concerns. By denition, learning from
others requires the ability to go beyond ones local experience. It is therefore related to
globalization. In the context of the search for best practices, globalization may have two
e¤ects. First, decision makers observe what other decision makers do. Globalization therefore
widens the scope for learning as more experiences can be exchanged. Second, the market
receives more information about local decision-makers. By the market we mean the people
in the eyes of whom a decision-maker wants to come across as competent. For example, the
peers of a medical specialist may observe that his practice gains more adherents in other
areas. Or, in line with the EU example, a citizen of a country may observe that politicians
or administrative bureaucracies adopt policies from another country. Therefore, as a result
of globalisation, the market can compare treatments or policies across places. We will argue
that this aspect of globalization has important implications for how reputational concerns
a¤ect communication and nal decisions.
The main objective of our analysis is to better understand the e¤ects of (i) the structure
of the learning process (decentralization versus centralization) and (ii) the degree of global-
ization of the market on the quality of information exchange and, in turn, on the quality of
decisions. We use an incomplete contracts approach to understand the way in which com-
munication about the quality of locally adopted technologies is a¤ected by the assignment
of decision rights. In that sense, we follow Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008). In
particular, we do not endow some mechanism designer with the ability to rst design com-
plete contracts that prompt agents to reveal their information and next to commit to them.
Clearly, a mechanism design approach would demonstrate the superiority of centralization,
and would not contribute to our understanding of the e¤ects of globalization on the decision
whether or not to centralize.6
We present a simple two-period model of learning in which agents care both about adopt-
6See Mookherjee (2006) for an excellent survey on the centralization-decentralization debate from a mech-
anism design perspective. It is perhaps worth noting that in the context of a search for best practices a
central authority does not always exist. A temporary one (e.g., a health care consensus panel) must be
created. It might be hard for such a temporary central authority to commit to mechanisms.
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ing the better practice and about acquiring a reputation for nding the better practice (med-
ical intervention, policy etc.). Through learning-by-doing each agent gains information about
the value of his own practice. We assume this information to be private and non-veriable.
The information exchanged then amounts to cheap talk. In the conclusion, we briey discuss
how our main results would be a¤ected if information were veriable.
We now turn to a discussion of our results. In period one, an agent adopts a practice
he considers to be the better one. In case of a decentralized learning process, the period
two decision is characterized by inertia. This arises as, in equilibrium, continuation of ones
initial technology commands a higher reputation than change as it signals higher observed
values of the practice and therefore a better initial choice. Hence, given the information an
agent has, he sticks to his initial choice even though it would have been rst-best to switch.
The information he has is partly gained through learning-by-doing, partly by what others
are willing to share with him. The quality of information exchange in the decision-making
process is high if markets are unaware of practices used by other agents (local markets). An
agent can only gain by listening to others, and has nothing to loose by truthfully revealing
his own experience, as his reputation does not depend on the practice that the other agent
adopts in period two.
When markets gain a better understanding of the technologies that are initially adopted
in other places thanks to progressing globalization (global markets) an agents reputation
starts to depend on what technologies he and others use. His reputation is particularly strong
if others start to adopt hisinitial technology. As a result, the role of communication in the
decision-making process becomes strategic. Global markets create competition. An agent
wants to convince others that histechnology is best. We show that communication breaks
down completely: an agent only learns which technology has been used in other places. This
is reminiscent of the experience of the OMC, a case of decentralized learning with global
markets. We present conditions under which the globalization of markets in case learning is
decentralized hurts welfare.
Decision-making in a centralized learning process does not su¤er from inertia as the center
only cares about the technologys value. But the center depends on the agents to provide
him with information. An agent now faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, as the agent
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has no decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the center is well-informed. On
the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants the center to impose his
technology at either site. In equilibrium, each agent sends coarse information about his own
practice. We derive conditions under which the globalization of markets in case learning
is centralized improves welfare. We also derive the conditions under which, in the case
of local markets, the quality of information exchange is so poor under centralized learning
(vis-à-vis decentralized learning) that it o¤sets the improved decision-making conditional
on information. Furthermore, we establish that in the case of global markets a centralized
learning process uniformly outperforms a decentralized learning process. One reason is that
with global markets communication between the agents and the center does not vanish,
however much the agents care about their reputations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. In
Section 3, we present the model. Section 4 analyses isolated agents, a benchmark situation
in which agents can learn from their own past experience only. In section 5 we analyse
decentralized learning, with local and global markets. In section 6 we perform the same
analysis for centralized learning. Section 7 contains the comparisons. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature that studies how the quality of information exchange
is determined by the features of the decision-making process. This literature takes an incom-
plete contracts approach to decision-making in which commitment is limited to the ex ante
assignment of decision rights. As a result, communication among agents amounts to cheap
talk. In their seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that the quality of cheap talk
depends on the degree of alignment between the interests of the informed sender and the
uninformed decision-maker (receiver). In Crawford and Sobel, and in the literature on cheap
talk in general, this degree of alignment is exogenously given. In our model, by contrast,
this degree is determined in equilibrium. The reason is that senders are concerned with their
reputations. These reputations are determined in equilibrium. There is now a growing lit-
erature that explores how characteristics of decision-making processes inuence the quality
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of communication, both in political science7, and in economics8. The current paper di¤ers
from the existing literature in its focus on the possibilities for learning-by-doing and learning
from the experience of others in a context where agents have reputational concerns.
The desirability of decentralization or centralization is also studied by Alonso et al.
(2008) and by Rantakari (2008) in the context of a multidivisional rm. Each division
benets from adapting its decision to its own market circumstances and from coordinating
its decision with those of the other divisions. Divisions are privately informed about their
market circumstances. They can either exchange information and next decide independently
of each other what decisions to take or they can report information to headquarters which
then decides for both divisions. They show that even if coordination becomes of overriding
concern to the rm, decentralization may still outperform centralization due to the di¤erence
in quality of communication.9
As Alonso et al. and Rantakari we study the e¤ect of the assignment of decision rights
on the quality of communication and of the nal decisions taken. The situation we analyse,
however, is quite di¤erent. In our paper, there are no local circumstances to which a decision
should ideally be adapted, nor is there a need to coordinate per se. Instead, there is room
for learning from each others past experience (to identify the better technology), resistance
to change (because of reputational concerns), and possibly the desire to convince the other
to adopt ones technology (due to reputational concerns in case of global markets).
There is a growing literature on reputational concerns. Holmstrom (1999) studies the
incentives such concerns give to exert productive e¤ort if there is uncertainty about an
agents ability level. If there is uncertainty about an agents ability to reador predict the
state of the world one speaks of expertmodels. Experts use the recommendations that they
give, the implementation decision that they take, or the e¤ort they exert to convince the
market of their expertise.10 Part of this expert literature looks at the e¤ects of information
7See e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Austen-Smith (1990), Coughlan (2000), and Austen-Smith and
Feddersen (2005).
8See e.g. Dessein (2002, 2007), Visser and Swank (2007), Alonso et al. (2008), Rantakari (2008), and
Friebel and Raith (2010).
9Friebel and Raith (2010) study how the scope of the rm a¤ects the quality of strategic information
transmission between a division and head quarters.
10Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001, 2006) deal with the advice given by
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disclosure (transparency) about an experts actions and about the outcomes of decisions.11
Clearly, the present paper is related to that literature. Globalization of markets, for example,
amounts to increased disclosure of information that is useful in evaluating an agents ability.
We show that it destroys communication in case of decentralized learning, but improves it
in case of centralized learning. That is, the same form of transparency may give rise to very
di¤erent e¤ects depending on the institutions in which it is introduced.
Our paper is also related to the literature on laboratory federalism and policy di¤usion
in political science, see Oates (1999). In an interesting recent paper, Volden, Ting, and
Carpenter (2008) study what happens if policy makers trade o¤policy e¤ectiveness at solving
problems and political preferences. They compare the adoption patterns of states that act
independently and learn from their own past performance at addressing common problems
with the patterns that arise if states learn from each other. Our focus is di¤erent from theirs
as we study the quality of information exchange among decision-makers, compare centralized
and decentralized decision-making, and study the e¤ect of information that markets have on
adoption decisions.
Finally, our paper is related to the existing literature on learning from others. This
literature is, however, methodologically quite di¤erent from ours. In the existing literature,
it is assumed that either an agent observes the true value of the actions taken by others,
whether the environment is strategic12 or not13, or that no such information is observed at
experts. Milbourn et al (2001) and Suurmond et al. (2004), deal with the projects an expert implements
and the e¤ort he exerts to become informed.
11See Suurmond et al. (2004) and Prat (2005) in a single-agent setting, and Levy (2007) and Swank and
Visser (2009) in a committee setting.
12See the discussion of social learning in a strategic experimentation game in Bergemann and Välimäki
(2006). In this literature, it is assumed that an agent perfectly observes both the technology others use and
the true value they obtain. It is not clear that an agent, if he could, would not want to deviate from a
strategy of truthfully revealing the value of the technology he has gained experience with. It seems that he
would benet from exaggerating the value as this would make adoption by others more likely. As a result,
more (public) information would become available about this technology, and the deviator would benet
from an improved estimate of the technologys value.
13See Bala and Goyal (1998) for a model of learning in non-strategic networks, and Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993, 1995) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) for analyses of word-of-mouth communication in non-
strategic environments.
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all14. Furthermore, inertia is an exogenous factor. For example, in the literature on word-of-
mouth communication, it is assumed that only a given fraction of agents updates its decisions
once new information becomes available. In our paper both the quality of the information
exchange and the degree of inertia are equilibrium outcomes. Were it not for the reputational
concerns, the problem the agents are facing in our model, that of choosing one technology out
of many, is similar to a common value bandit problem in which the bandits arms represent
the technologies of unknown, but common, value.15 The main di¤erence is that in a bandit
problem the distribution of the value of a technology does not change with an observation
of the value of another technology, whereas in our problem it does. This stems from the fact
that in our model the initial signal an agent receives provides information about the better
technology. The higher is the observed value of a technology Y , the higher is the probability
that the agent identied the better technology. And this means that it becomes more likely
that the value of the other technology is lower than the actual value of Y .
The fact that in our model the quality of information exchange and the degree of iner-
tia are endogenous, and that a key assumption of the statistical bandit model is violated
imply that a general analysis of the asymptotic behaviour of the decision-making processes
described here is di¢ cult and beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we compare the
behaviour of agents across various decision-making processes in a two-period setting.
3 A model of learning-by-doing and learning from oth-
ers with reputational concerns.
There are two sites (hospitals, states, etc.), i 2 f1; 2g, and one problem. There is an agent i
at each site. Often, j will denote the other siteor the other agent,j 6= i. The problem
has to be addressed at each site both in period t = 1 and in t = 2. There are two possible
technologies (policies, interventions, etc.) X 2 fY; Zg, one of which has to be used to
14In the literature on informational herding, communication between decision-makers is excluded although
the environment in non-strategic. See e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998). See Çelen, Kariv
and Schotter (2008) for a rst experimental analysis of social learning from actions and advice.
15See Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) for a concise survey of bandit problems.
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address the problem at each site in each period. The technology adopted at site i in period
t is denoted by Xi;t. A priori, the value of technology X is unknown, but independent of
time and site. Moreover, we assume that it is a random draw from a continuous and strictly
increasing distribution function FX () and associated density function fX (), with support
[0; 1]. Note that we use X both to denote a technology and its random value. We assume
that the values Y and Z are iid, FY = FZ = F . We use lower case letters, like x, to denote
a possible value of technology X, such that x 2 [0; 1]. As strategies will be dened in terms
of X (or x), it will be useful to let XC (or xC) refer to the other technology. That is, if
X = Y , then XC = Z, etc.
The agentsdiagnostic ability levels i 2

; 
	
and the state of the world (y; z) 2 [0; 1]2
are exogenously given. The ability levels and the state of the world are all statistically
independent, with  = Pr
 
i = 
 2 (0; 1) for i 2 f1; 2g.
At the beginning of period t = 1, agent i at site i receives a private, non-veriable, sig-
nal si 2

sY ; sZ
	
about which technology solves the problem best. The informativeness of
the signal depends on the agents ability: Pr
 
sX jx > xC ;  = 1, Pr  sX jxC > x;  = 0,
Pr
 
sX jx > xC ;  = Pr  sX jxC > x;  = 1=2, for X 2 fY; Zg. That is, if i is highly
able, i = , the signal (diagnosis) reveals with probability one the better technology:
Pr
 
x > xC jsX ;  = 1 for X 2 fY; Zg. Hence, conditional on sX and  = , X is dis-
tributed as the maximum of two iid random variables, FX
 
xjsX ;  = F (x)2. On the other
hand, if i is less able, i = , the signal is uninformative about the relative quality of the
technology: FX
 
xjsX ;  = F (x). Note that an agent does not get a signal about his ability.
Instead,  is the common prior.16 Still in period 1, i next decides which technology X to
adopt on the basis of his signal si. At the end of the period he learns the value x of the
chosen technology (learning-by-doing).
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that the focus of our analysis will be on period 2.
As mentioned in the introduction, we intend to understand the pros and cons of alternative
learning processes in situations where (i) agents have gained experiences with di¤erent tech-
nologies, treatments, or policies and (ii) there is scope for learning. In our model, period
16What matters for the results is that if i = , member i has a higher likelihood of correctly assessing
the state of the economy than if i = .
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1 can be interpreted as the history in which agents gained information. We model history
to stress that past decisions matter for current decisions, for example, through reputational
concerns.
We distinguish three learning processes p that characterize period t = 2. Such a process
consists of a decision-making stage, possibly preceded by a communication stage. In case
there is a communication stage, agent i sends a message about the quality of the technology
adopted at site i in period t = 1. The receiver of this message depends on the process
p. We assume that agent i, if and when he sends a message, knows the technology (not
its value) that j has used in t = 1 when he sends a message. This is often the relevant
case, as agents may well be aware that other technologies are used, without knowing their
quality. Hence, a communication strategy pi () is a conditional probability distribution. Let
pi (mijsi; xi;1; Xj;1) be the likelihood that i sends message mi 2 M , where M = [0; 1] is a
message space, in case his signal equals si, the observed value of Xi;1 equals xi;1, and agent
j uses technology Xj;1. Next, a decision maker determines which technology Xi;2 is adopted
at site i at time t = 2. Who this decision maker is depends on the decision process p. Let
Ipi 2 Ipi be the information this person has at the beginning of the decision-making stage. It
depends on the process p. The decision strategy dpi determines the relationship between I
p
i
and the technology adopted at site i.
(i) In case of isolated agents (p=ia), agents do not communicate, and therefore do not know
what technology is being used at the other site. Hence, I iai =

sY ; sZ
	[0; 1]: the information
i has is a signal and the value of the technology used in t = 1. Agent i decides on Xi;2. Let
diai (si; xi;1) 2 fY; Zg denote the technology that i uses in t = 2 given his signal si and the
observed value xi;1.
(ii) In case of decentralized learning (p=dl), each agent i simultaneously sends a message mi
to the other agent concerning the value of the technology he has adopted in t = 1. So,
Idli =

sY ; sZ
	 [0; 1]M fY; ZgM . That is, in addition to the information in case of
p=ia, and the message he sends to j, i also knows the technology Xj;1 2 fY; Zg adopted at
the other site, and the message mj 2 M about the value of that technology. Agent i next
decides on Xi;2. Let ddli (si; xi;1;mi; Xj;1;mj) 2 fY; Zg denote the technology that i adopts
in t = 2 given Idli .
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(iii) In case of centralized learning (p=cl), each agent i simultaneously sends a message mi
concerning the value of the technology he has adopted in t = 1 to the center.Hence, IclC =
fY; Zg2 M2 represents the centers information set: information about which technology
has been adopted at each site, and a message concerning the value of each technology. Next,
the center decides which technology is adopted at either site. Let dclC (X1;1; X2;1;m1;m2) 2
fY; Zg  fY; Zg denote the correspondence indicating for given technologies used at either
site and for given messages sent by the agents the technology that is used at sites 1 and 2,
respectively in t = 2. As no confusion can arise, we write IC instead of IclC , and dC instead
of dclC .
As noted in the introduction, globalization has two e¤ects: rst, it allows a previously
isolated agent to learn from the experience of others, and second, it o¤ers more information
about a local agent to the market. The market at site i at time t is characterized by its
information, 
i;t. An agent learns about technologies and their values through learning-by-
doing and by listening to others. We assume that the market knows less about technologies
than an agent does: markets only know certain patterns of technology adoption. In par-
ticular, in t = 1, 
i;1 = fXi;1g for i 2 f1; 2g. For t = 2, we distinguish two cases. Say
that markets are local, if markets possess knowledge about site-specic adoption patterns
only, 
i;2 = fXi;1; Xi;2g for i 2 f1; 2g. Say that markets are global, if markets possess
knowledge about all adoption patterns, 
i;2 = fXi;1; Xj;1; Xi;2; Xj;2g for i 2 f1; 2g. We
call (Xi;1; Xj;1; Xi;2; Xj;2) the adoption vector, indicating which technologies are adopted in
t = 1 at sites i and j, and in t = 2 at sites i and j, respectively. Clearly then, we assume
that learning-by-doing gives the agent an informational advantage over his market: whereas
an agent learns the true value of the technology he uses, his market only observes certain
adoption patterns.17
To analyse the e¤ect of reputational concerns, we assume that an agents utility depends
on the value of the technology adopted at his site and on his markets assessment of his
ability. The ex post belief that i is highly able conditional on the information set 
i;t
17What is important for the results is that agent i has an informational advantage over his market. As long
as such an advantage exists, the agent will use the technology adoption decision to inuence the markets
view on his ability, and the communication strategies will qualitatively remain the same.
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equals ^i;t (
i;t) = Pr
 
i = j
i;t

. If x is the value of the technology Xi;t that i adopts,
and the markets information set equals 
i;t, then the period t utility of agent i equals
U (Xi;t) = x + ^i;t (
i;t), with  > 0 the relative weight of reputational concerns. We
ignore time discounting. The centers utility equals the sum of the values of the technologies
adopted in t = 2, UC (X1;2; X2;2) = x1;2 + x2;2.
Di¤erent decision processes cause di¤erences in behaviour in the second period, but
not in the rst. This will be readily apparent from the analysis in the following sections.
Independent of the decision process, period t = 1 behaviour that maximizes agent is utility
is to follow his signal: Xi;1 = Y if and only if si = sY . This maximizes the expected value of
the technology and minimizes the probability of changing (or having to change) technology
in period 2.
An equilibrium consists of a communication strategy i () for each agent, a belief func-
tion fi (jI) for each decision maker, a decision strategy di () for each decision maker, and
ex post assessments ^i;t () for each market. We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (from now on, equilibrium) to characterize behaviour. This requires (i) that the
communication strategies are optimal for each type given decision makers strategies and
market assessments; (ii) that the decision strategy is optimal given the belief functions and
market assessments; (iii) that beliefs and market assessments are obtained using Bayes rule.
Because of the inherent symmetry, we write the analysis from the point of view of agent
i = 1 and assume that s1 = sY . Of course, s2 2

sY ; sZ
	
. We ignore babbling equilibria if
an equilibrium in which information is transmitted exists.
4 Isolated agents
Once agent 1 has followed his signal sY in period 1 and observed value y, he has to decide
whether to continue with his technology. Note that having received sY and next observing
y allows an agent to update the expected value of the other technology,
E

ZjsY ; y = Pr  jsY ; yE ZjsY ; y; + Pr  jsY ; yE [Z] , (1)
where we have used that E

ZjsY ; y;  = E [Z]. Two e¤ects of y can be distinguished. First,
the larger is y, the more likely it is that the agent is highly able and correctly identied
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the more valuable technology. This is the Pr
 
jsY ; y term. Second, conditional on the
agent being highly able, a higher value of y increases the expected value of Z. This is the
E

ZjsY ; y;  term. Of course, E ZjsY ; y;   E [Z]. The following lemma summarizes
some characteristics of E

ZjsY ; y.
Lemma 1 The expected value of Z given si = sY and y satises: (a) E

ZjsY ; 0 =
E

ZjsY ; 1 = E [Z], and E ZjsY ; y < E [Z] for y 2 (0; 1); (b) E ZjsY ; y is decreas-
ing in y for y < E

ZjsY ; y, increasing for y > E ZjsY ; y, and y = E ZjsY ; y has a
unique solution.
This lemma is illustrated in Figure 1, panel a. The horizontal line represents the uncon-
ditional expectation E [Z], and the conditional expectation E

ZjsY ; y is a convex function
of y.
Figure 1: Isolated Agents. Panel a depicts the rst-best threshold value; panel b the equilib-
rium threshold value yia for  < ia; panel c reports the equilibrium values for fX = 1 and
 = 1=2. Thus, ia = 1. Note that ^
 is the equilibrium reputational gap.
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[
Z|sY , y] :
E [Z] :
(b) 0 < λ < λ¯ia (c) fX = 1 and pi = 1/2
λ¯iaλ
y¯∗ia :
∆pˆi∗ :
Ignore reputational concerns for the moment. Given I ia1 =

sY ; y
	
, the decision strategy
that maximizes the expected value of the technology adopted at site 1 in the second period,
the rst-best strategy, is to stick to the existing technology if and only if y  E ZjsY ; y.
It follows from lemma 1, part (b), and it is clear from Figure 1, panel a, that the rst-best
decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy,
dia1
 
I ia; t

=
8<: Y if y  tZ otherwise,
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with t = yFBia and where y
FB
ia solves y
FB
ia = E

ZjsY ; yFBia

.
Besides being interested in picking the most valuable technology, an agent is also in-
terested in his reputation. Consider a threshold decision strategy and any threshold value
t 2 (0; 1). Recall that in case of isolated agents, markets only have local knowledge. Let
^ (Y;X1;2; t) denote the reputation, obtained using Bayesrule, if X1;2 2 fY; Zg, and the
agent uses the threshold t. Then,18
^1 (Y; Y ; t) =
1 + F (t)
1 + F (t)
 >  > ^1 (Y; Z; t) =
F (t)
F (t) + (1  ). (2)
Irrespective of t, continuation commands a higher reputation than switching to the other
technology. Continuation suggests having observed a su¢ ciently high value of y. A highly
able agent is more likely to have implemented a technology that generates a high value than
a less able agent. Hence, as an agent cares about his reputation, he wants to deviate from the
rst-best decision rule by lowering the hurdle that his initial technology should pass for its
continuation. The agent wants to give up technological adequacy for reputational benets.
We will call the di¤erence ^1 (Y; Y ; t)   ^1 (Y; Z; t) the reputational gap. It is the source of
the distortion. Proposition 1 describes equilibrium behaviour of an isolated agent.
Proposition 1 In case of isolated agents, and for  < ia = E [Z] =, there exists an equi-
librium in whicth the decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy with threshold value yia
that satises
 [^1 (Y; Y ; y

ia)  ^1 (Y; Z; yia)] = E

ZjsY ; yia
  yia, (3)
with yia 2
 
0; yFBia

. yia is a decreasing function of .
19 For   ia, yia = 0, i.e., agent 1
always continues his initial technology, and ^1 (Y; Y ; 0) =  and ^1 (Y; Z; 0) = 0.
Eq (3) is illustrated in Figure 1, panel b. At the threshold value yia the agent is indif-
ferent between sticking to Y and switching to Z. This can also be seen by rewriting (3)
as yia + ^1 (Y; Y ; y

ia) = E

ZjsY ; yia

+ ^1 (Y; Z; y

ia). The left-hand side equals the value
18Deriviations can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
19We cannot exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria in general. In case of multiple equilibria, we show
that the highest and the lowest equilibrium values of yia are decreasing functions of . We have established
numerically that in case of the uniform distribution, the equilibrium is unique, in this and all other sections.
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of continuing with Y if its observed value equals yia, whereas the left-hand side equals the
value of switching technology for the same observed value of Y . It follows from (2) that
the lower yia is, the lower is the reputation the agent commands in case of sticking to the
original technology and in case of switching technologies. If the hurdle for continuation is
lowered, passing the hurdle becomes a less convincing signal of diagnostic ability. At the
same time, not passing a lower hurdle becomes a stronger signal of incompetence. It can
be checked that the reputational gap increases the lower is yia. As the reputational gap is
still strictly positive for a threshold value equal to zero, it follows from (3) that for   ia
yia = 0: the agent will continue with his initial choice of technology irrespective of its value.
Figure 1, panel c illustrates the proposition for a uniform distribution and  = 1=2. It shows
the equilibrium values of yia and ^1 (Y; Y ; y

ia)  ^1 (Y; Z; yia).
5 Decentralized learning process
We begin by describing rst-best behaviour in a decentralized process. In the communication
stage each agent truthfully reveals his private information. Say that 1 truthfully reveals his
private information if, for all y 2 [0; 1], and all X2;1 2 fY; Zg, Pr
 
m1jsY ; y;X2;1

= 1 if
m1 = y and Pr
 
m1jsY ; y;X2;1

= 0 otherwise. Next, the rst-best decision strategy equals
ddl1
 
Idl1 ; y
FB
S

=
8>>><>>>:
Y if X2;1 = Y and y  yFBS
Y if X2;1 = Z and y  z
Z otherwise,
where yFBS satises y
FB
S = E

ZjsY ; sY ; yFBS

. That is, if both agents adopted the same
technology, each agent should continue this technology if its value is larger than yFBS .
20 If
instead agents adopted di¤erent technologies, they should next choose the one with superior
performance. In 5.1 we study equilibrium behaviour in case of local markets, and in 5.2 we
turn to global markets. In 7.1, we compare the performance of decentralized learning under
local and global markets.
20Of course, the fact that both experts used the same technology in the rst period bodes well for the
superiority of this technology: yFBS < y
FB
ia .
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5.1 Local markets
By denition, local markets only know the technology that is adopted locally. Can truthful
revelation be part of an equilibrium? With agent 1s reputation independent of what the
other agent decides, and with agent 1 being free to choose what technology to adopt in
t = 2, truthful revelation of the technologys value is a weakly dominant communication
strategy for each agent. Absent any motive to inuence the other agent, the quality of the
information exchange is high.
Once communication has taken place, each agent independently decides whether to con-
tinue with his original technology or to switch to the other technology. Let a double-threshold
strategy ddl1
 
Idl1 ; tS; tD

with thresholds (tS; tD) = 0 be dened as
ddl1
 
Idl1 ; tS; tD

=
8>>><>>>:
Y if X2;1 = Y and y  tS
Y if X2;1 = Z and y  m2   tD
Z otherwise.
That is, agent 1 continues with his original technology Y (i) if both agents used the same
technology and its value exceeds tS; or (ii) if the agents used di¤erent technologies, but the
other technology is either less valuable or its superior performance does not exceed by a
margin larger than tD the value of the current technology. Let ^1 (Y;X; tS; tD) denote 1s
reputation if he uses ddl1 (), and adopts X1;2 = X in period 2, with X 2 fY; Zg.
To see that an agent wants to distort the decision on X1;2, suppose 1 were to use the
rst-best threshold values, (tS; tD) =
 
yFBdl ; 0

. If 1 continues with his initial technology, his
market would deduce that either the same technology was used at the other site and its
observed value exceeded yFBdl , or that the other site used the other technology which proved
to be of inferior quality. Either event strengthens 1s reputation. Analogously, discontinuing
a technology hurts a reputation. As a result, reputational concerns induce an agent to
distort the decision in t = 2. If both agents adopted Y in t = 1, then agent 1 sticks
to this technology if and only if y + ^1 (Y; Y ; tS; tD)  E

ZjsY ; sY ; y + ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD).
Similarly, in case agents adopted di¤erent technologies, agent 1 wants to continue with Y i¤
y + ^1 (Y; Y ; tS; tD)  z + ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD). Proposition 2 describes equilibrium behaviour.
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Proposition 2 Dene lodl = E [Z] =^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) and 
lo
dl = 1=. In case of decentral-
ized learning with local markets, an equilibrium exists in which
(i) it is a weakly dominant communication strategy to truthfully reveal private information;
(ii) the belief functions are Pr (x2;1jm2) = 1 for x2;1 = m2 and Pr (x2;1jm2) = 0 for x2;1 6= m2;
(iii) the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy. For  < lodl, threshold values (t

S; t

D)
satisfy
 [^1 (Y; Y ; t

S; t

D)  ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD)] = E

ZjsY ; sY ; tS
  tS (4)
 [^1 (Y; Y ; t

S; t

D)  ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD)] = tD, (5)
with tS 2
 
0; yFBS

and tD 2 (0; 1). For  2 [lodl; lodl), threshold values are (0; tD) and tD
solves ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; tD) = t

D. Finally, for   lodl, threshold values equal (0; 1).
Figure 2, panels a and b show the structure of the equilibrium. For  < lodl, see panel
a and Eqs (4) and (5), in equilibrium the size of the distortions, E

ZjsY ; sY ; tS
   tS and
tD, and the value of the reputational gap,  [^1 (Y; Y ; t

S; t

D)  ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD)], are the same.
The loss in technological value due to the distortion should in either case be compensated by
the same boost in reputation. At  = lodl, t

S = 0, and t

D = E [Z]. Then, the market deduces
from (Y; Z) that y < z, and so 1 initially picked the inferior technology, ^1 (Y; Z; 0; E [Z]) = 0.
Also, ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) >  as the market infers from (Y; Y ) that either both agents initially
received sY , or that the other agent received sZ but y  z   tD. Either possibility boosts
agent 1s reputation. It follows from (4) that lodl = E [Z] =^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) < E [Z] =. For
 2 [lodl; lodl), illustrated in panel b, if 1 learns that 2 used the same technology, he continues
his initial technology irrespective of its value y, tS = 0.
If agents initially used di¤erent technologies, then for   lodl, 1 sticks to his initial
technology Y , irrespective of its value y, and regardless of what 2 reports, (tS; t

D) = (0; 1).
Then ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; 1) =  as continuation of Y does not reveal any information on ability,
while ^1 (Y; Z; 0; 1) = 0 is a plausible out-of-equilibrium belief. Hence, 
lo
dl = 1=. Panel c
illustrates the reputational gap and the threshold values for the uniform distribution and
 = 1=2. The reputional gap rises for  < lodl to ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) > , and declines to 
for lodl <   lodl.
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Figure 2: Decentralized learning and local markets. Panels a and b depict the structure of
equilibrium. Panel c reports equilibrium threshold values and the reputational gap for the
uniform distribution and  = 1=2. Hence, lodl < 1 and 
lo
dl = 2.
5.2 Global markets
We start by showing that rst-best behaviour, described on page 15, is not equilibrium
behaviour. Suppose imputed equilibrium behaviour is rst-best behaviour. Then, if agents
initially adopted di¤erent technologies, the only adoption vectors possible are (Y; Z; Y; Y )
and (Y; Z; Z; Z). The inference the market draws from the rst (resp. second) vector is
that Y (resp. Z) is the superior technology, and that 1 made the correct (resp. wrong)
choice. The correct choice can be thanks to skill, or due to low ability and luck. The wrong
choice, by contrast, must be due to low ability. Hence21, ^1 (Y; Z; Y; Y ) = 21+ >  and
^1 (Y; Z; Z; Z) = 0. Clearly, from a reputational point of view, the former is the best and
the latter is the worst that could happen to agent 1. Could 1 convince 2 to adopt his
technology? Rather than truthful revelation, consider the following deviation strategy in
case of di¤erent initial technologies: send m1 = 1 independent of y, and in the decision
stage stick to Y if and only if y  m2. The e¤ect of this deviation strategy is that 1
convinces 2 to adopt Y in t = 2. Whether 1 continues with Y depends on the reported value
m2 and y. For y  m2, the adoption vector in t = 2 becomes (Y; Z; Y; Y ), the same as it
21See the proof of Proposition 3.
18
would have been had 1 stuck to truthful revelation. If y < m2, the adoption vector in case
of the deviation strategy equals (Y; Z; Z; Y ), whereas in case of truthful revelation it would
have been (Y; Z; Z; Z). The reputation implied by such a deviation is not determined by the
imputed equilibrium behaviour. However, it is consistent with the model to assume that,
given any adoption vector, any increase in the use at t = 2 of the technology 1 adopted in
t = 1 does not decreases the reputation of 1.
Assumption 1 Consider any adoption vector with X1;1 = Y . The reputation of 1 does
not decrease if 1 (resp. 2) changes from X1;2 = Z to X1;2 = Y (resp. from X2;2 = Z to
X2;2 = Y ).
With this assumption, the deviation is advantageous in terms of reputation, and costless
in terms of technical adequacy. We have proved the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 First-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of decentralized learning
with global markets.
The above line of reasoning can be applied to any imputed equilibrium in which, in case
agents started by adopting di¤erent technologies, 2s decision regarding X2;2 depends on the
message m1 of 1. The protable deviation is then for 1 to send the message that induces 2
to adopt Y , and to continue to base his own decision for t = 2 on a comparison of y and
the expected value of Z given m2. This shows that the unique equilibrium communication
strategy in case X2;1 = Z is a pooling strategy.22 The interest an agent has to convince
the other to agent to switch technology destroys all meaningful communication. This is in
line with one of the concerns expressed about the OMC in the EU, a case of a decentralized
learning process with global markets.
In case agents initially adopted the same technology, Y , it is easy to see that truthful
revelation is an equilibrium strategy. Communication is also irrelevant.23 Proposition 3
22To avoid a discussion of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we assume that each agent uses a probability distrib-
ution over the full support [0; 1] that is independent of the value y he observed. We refer to this equilibrium
communication strategy simply by pooling strategy.
23This is so as in our model technologies have a common value that is learned before agents communicate
in t = 2.
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below establishes that in this case an agent wants to deviate from rst-best behaviour in the
decision stage.
As communication breaks down in case of di¤erent initial technologies, and is irrelevant
in case of the same initial technology, the equilibrium decision strategy of 1 amounts to a
comparison of y with a cut-o¤ value that depends on the number of agents that used the
same technology in t = 1. Let a double-cut-o¤ strategy with cut-o¤s (cS; cD) = 0 be dened
as
ddl1
 
Idl1 ; cS; cD

=
8>>><>>>:
Y if X2;1 = Y and y  cS
Y if X2;1 = Z and y  cD
Z otherwise.
Of course, conditional on the information exchanged, the values of cS and cD that would
maximize the technological value are cS = yFBS , and cD = E [Z].
24 The next Proposition
describes equilibrium behaviour.25
Proposition 3 Dene gldl = E [Z]
1+2
(1+)
and gldl = E [Z]
1+

. In case of decentralized learn-
ing with global markets, there exists an equilibrium in which
(i) the communication strategy is (a) a pooling strategy if initial technologies di¤er, and (b)
truthful revelation if initial technologies are the same;
(ii) the belief function equals (a) the density f1
 
zjIdl1

= f (z) for all z and m2 in case
X2;1 = Z; and (b) discrete probabilities in case X2;1 = Y , Pr (yjm2) = 1 for y = m2 and
Pr (yjm2) = 0 for y 6= m2;
(iii) the decision strategy is a double-cut-o¤ strategy. The cut-o¤ value in case initial tech-
nologies are the same, cS, satises
 [^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; c

S)  ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Y )] = E

ZjsY ; sY ; cS
  cS, (6)
with cS 2
 
0; yFBS

for  < gldl. c

S is a decreasing function of .
26 For   gldl, cS = 0. The
cut-o¤ value in case initial technologies di¤er, cD, satises


1 + 
= E [Z]  cD; (7)
24Note that E

ZjsY ; sZ ; y = E [Z].
25In what follows, we assume that the out-of-equilibrium belief ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Y ) equals ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Z).
26The remark made in footnote 19 applies.
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with cD 2
 
0; yFBD

for  < gldl. c

D is a decreasing function of . For   gldl, cD = 0.
Figure 3, panels a and b correspond to (6) and (7), respectively.
Figure 3: Decentralized learning and global markets. Panels a and b depict the structure of
equilibrium. Panel c reports equilibrium cut-o¤ values and reputational gaps for fX = 1 and
 = 1=2. ^1 (S) denotes ^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; cS)  ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Y ), and ^1 (D) = 1+ .
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Panel c shows the equilibrium values in case of fX = 1 and  = 1=2. Eq (7) shows
that if agents adopted di¤erent technologies in t = 1, then the reputational gap is a constant
function of cD. To understand why, recall that ability means the ability to identify the better
technology. When the market observes that agents initially used di¤erent technologies, the
agentschoices in t = 2 either allow the market to infer who used the better and the worse
technology (i.c., (Y; Z; Z; Z) and (Y; Z; Y; Y )) or does not allow the market to infer any in-
formation on the relative performance of the technologies (i.c., (Y; Z; Y; Z) and (Y; Z; Z; Y )).
The value of cD does not provide additional information on an agents ability. Of course, if
the market observes that agents initially adopted the same technology, ^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; cS) does
depend on the cut-o¤ value: the lower is cS, the lower is the reputation an agent commands
in case of continuation.
Global markets know the technologies adopted at either site. Local markets do not have
such knowledge. As a result, there is a single reputational gap in case of local markets,
see the left-hand sides of (4) and (5) in Proposition 2. In a global market, there are two
reputational gaps. In panel c, ^1 (S) is the reputational gap in case both agents started
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with Y . Starting with the same technology is a good sign for each agents ability. Thus,
even if  increases and cS goes to zero ^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; c

S) > . On the other hand, the lower
is cS, the more switching indicates a poor choice in period 1. The net e¤ect is that the gap
increases in , see the proof.
6 Centralized learning Process
First-best behaviour in the case of a centralized learning process is for each agent to truthfully
reveal his private information, and for the center next to pick the technology with the higher,
reported or expected, value:
dC
 
IC ; y
FB
S

=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Y; Y if X2;1 = Y and m1  yFBS
Z;Z if X2;1 = Y and m1 < yFBS
Y; Y if X2;1 = Z and m1 > m2
Z;Z otherwise.
We start by showing that rst-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of cen-
tralized learning.
Lemma 3 Under centralized learning, an equilibrium in which agents truthfully reveal their
private information does not exist, neither in case of local nor in case of global markets.
It su¢ ces to show that agent 1 has an incentive to slightly exaggerate the value of Y in
case j adopted a di¤erent solution. If agents and planner were to stick to rst-best behaviour,
then an agent commands a higher reputation if he is allowed to continue with hissolution
than if he is forced to change. With local markets, ^1 (Y; Y ) > ^1 (Y; Z), and with global
markets ^i (Y; Y; Y; Y ) > ^i (Y; Z; Z; Z). In either case, assume i deviates by communicating
a slightly exaggerated value of his technology, y+" > y instead of y, with " > 0. Conditional
on this exaggeration changing the planners decision i.e., for z 2 (y; y + "), the benets equal
 [^i (Y; Y; Y; Y )  ^i (Y; Z; Z; Z)] > 0 and are independent of ", whereas the costs can be
made arbitrarily small by reducing the value of ". This shows that a protable deviation
from rst-best behaviour exists.
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Of course, in equilibrium an agent cannot systematically exaggerateas then the center
could simply undo the exaggeration. Instead, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), in equilibrium
information is lost as the agent adds noise to his message: he partitions the space of possible
technology values [0; 1] into intervals, and reports only to which interval the value of his
technology belongs. That is, he ranks its value, and the number of intervals equals the
number of possible ranks.
Let a (N)  (a0 (N) ; : : : ; aN (N)) denote a partition of [0; 1] in N intervals, with 0 =
a0 (N) < a1 (N) <    < aN (N) = 1. Agent 1 is said to use a partition strategy to
communicate if there exists a tuple (N; a (N)), such that p1
 
m1jsY ; y;X2;1

is uniform,
supported on [ar (N) ; ar+1 (N)] if y 2 (ar (N) ; ar+1 (N)) for r = 0; : : : ; N   1.27 We focus
on the highest value of N consistent with incentives. Say that agent 1 sends inuential
information (or that communication is inuential) if there are two messages m1 and m01
about Y and a message m2 about Z such that dC (m1;m2) = Y with probability one and
dC (m
0
1;m2) = Z with probability smaller than one. That is, the agent uses at least two
ranks, N  2. To save space, we write a instead of a (N) if this does not lead to confusion.
Does an agent truthfully report the value of his technology to the center if the other agent
uses the same technology in t = 1? Agent is interest are di¤erent from those of the center,
but identical to those of the agent j. This o¤ers room for the agents to (tacitly) collude, and
to induce the center to choose the technology they deem best. Each can send either of two
messages, one such that the center will next decide that the technology is su¢ ciently good
to merit continuation, and one inducing the center to force the agents to switch. Note that
collusive behaviour of this sort seems easy to sustain as there is no asymmetric information
among the agents.28 Although this is a partition strategy with N  2, to distinguish it from
the more general partition strategy in case agents use di¤erent technologies, we refer to it
27Note that between any two partitions the expert uses a random strategy. This guarantees that in
equilibrium any possible message is sent with strictly positive probability. A discussion of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs (what should the planner think about the value of a technology if he were to observe a non-equilibrium
message?) can thus be avoided.
28In a previous version of this paper we show that truthfully revealing information to the center in case
agents use the same technology can be part of equilibrium. However, it amounts to playing a weakly
dominated strategy, an unlikely candidate to describe agentsbehaviour.
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as a collusion strategy. It is completely characterized by a single value, yS 2 [0; 1], for which
an agent is indi¤erent between sending one message rather than the other.
Let the center choose the technology that is the better one given the messages of the
agents. In case they rank di¤erent technologies the same, the center is indi¤erent and tosses
a coin. Even if both agents report on the same technology, the center may still decide to
make them switch to the other technology. Formally,
dC (IC) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Y; Y if X2;1 = Y and E [Y jmmin]  E [Zjmmin]
Z;Z if X2;1 = Y and E [Y jmmin] < E [Zjmmin]
Y; Y if X2;1 = Z and E [Y jIC ] > E [ZjIC ]
Y; Y if X2;1 = Z and E [Y jIC ] = E [ZjIC ] and coin = Y
Z;Z otherwise,
(8)
where coin= Y means that the center ips a fair coin with faces Y and Z, and Y comes
up, and where mmin := min [m1;m2] is the lower valued message sent concerning the same
technology. The contents of these messages what they imply concerning the expected
value of the technology are the same if m1;m2 2 [ar 1; ar) and they di¤er if m1 < ar 
m2 for some r.29 To state the belief function of the center, dene a truncated density as
follows: Tr (x; ar; ar+1) = g (x) = (F (ar+1)  F (ar)), where g (x) = f (x) for x 2 [ar; ar+1]
and g (x) = 0 everywhere else. The next proposition characterizes equilibrium behaviour.
Proposition 4 Dene locl = E [Z]
(3+2)(1+)
42
and glcl = E [Z]
1+2
(1+)
. In case of centralized
learning, there exists an equilibrium in which
(i) the centers decision strategy is as dened in (8).
(ii) the communication strategy is (a) a partition strategy (N; a) if initial technologies
di¤er, and (b) a collusion strategy yS if initial technologies are the same;
(ii) the centers belief function is (a) f1 (xi;1jIC) = Tr
 
xi;1; a

r; a

r+1

for mX1 2
 
ar; a

r+1

for
r = 0; : : : ; N 1 if initial technologies di¤er, and (b) f1 (yjIC) = Tr (y; 0; yS) for mY1 2 [0; yS]
29Note that we assume that the planner tosses a coin in case of X2;1 = Z and E

Y jIclC

= E

ZjIclC

. This
ensures harmonisation - sites adopt the same technology in t = 2. In a companion paper we analyse the
case where both sites can continue with their initial technologies. This has interesting consequences for the
nature and quality of communication.
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and f1 (x1;1jIC) = Tr (y; yS; 1) for mY1 2 (yS; 1] if initial technologies are the same;
(iii) in case of local markets, the partition a and the collusion strategy yS = y
lo
S satisfy


^
 
Y; Y ; yloS ; a
  ^  Y; Z; yloS ; a = E Zjar 1  z  ar+1  ar (9)


^
 
Y; Y ; yloS ; a
  ^  Y; Z; yloS ; a = E ZjsY ; sY ; yloS   yloS (10)
for r = 1; : : : ; N   1. For  < locl, N  2 and yloS > 0, whereas for   locl, N = 1 and
yloS = 0. That is, the agents do not send inuential information on y and z for   locl.
(iv) in case of global markets, the partition a satises
 [^1 (Y; Z; Y; Y ; a
)  ^1 (Y; Z; Z; Z; a)] = E

Zjar 1  z  ar+1
  ar (11)
for r = 1; : : : ; N   1. The collusion strategy yS = yglS satises

h
^

Y; Y; Y; Y ; yglS

  ^

Y; Y; Z; Z; yglS
i
= E
h
ZjsY ; sY ; yglS
i
  yglS . (12)
Moreover, for any nite , N  2. For  < glcl yglS > 0, whereas for   glcl yglS = 0.
That is, in case agents initially used di¤erent strategies, agents send inuential information
about y and z for any nite . If agents initially used the same technology, they do not send
inuential information about the technologys values for   glcl.
In case agents used di¤erent technologies, the communication strategy is a partition
strategy. Eqs (9) and (11) determine the partitioning in case of local and global markets,
respectively. If agent 1 observes a value y he has to decide how to rank his technology. The
higher the rank is, the more likely it becomes that the center chooses his technology. This
suggests that his technology is the better one. As a result, agent 1 enjoys a reputational
benet. Ranking it highly also has a cost. If z > y but agent 2 does not rank Z as highly
as 1 ranks Y , the center forces both agents to choose Y , the inferior technology in period 2.
This possibility stops the agent from ranking his technology too highly. The left-hand sides
of the equations state the net reputational value of continuing with ones technology. For
y = ar, this gain is exactly o¤set by a loss in expected project value due to continuation:
the agent is indi¤erent between using two adjacent ranks (messages) to describe the value of
technology Y . Sending one message rather than the other changes the choice of the center
only for z 2  ar 1; ar+1, see the right-hand side of (9) and (11).
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In terms of informativeness, a partition strategy is in between the truthful revelation that
characterizes communication among decentralized agents in a local market and the absence
of communication in case decentralized agents operate in global markets. That is, as a result
of the move from decentralized learning to centralized learning communication deteriorates
in case of local markets but improves in the presence of global markets. In a local market
the loss of an agents decision-making power and its uploading to the center means that an
agent starts to use his communication to indirectly inuence the perception of the market
of his ability. The quality of communication drops. In case of a global market the loss of
decision-making power makes that an agent becomes cautious when communicating: given
the communication strategy of the other agent, his own exaggerated claims are no longer
costless but can lead to an inferior choice at the agents own site.
To explain why inuential communication among agents and centre remains possible for
any nite  in case of global markets but vanishes for   locl in case of local markets, it is
useful to start by comparing the present model with the existing literature that uses cheap
talk. As noted in the related literature section, the existing literature focuses on situations
in which the di¤erence in preferences between Sender (S, here agent) and Receiver (R, here
center) is exogenously given. Consider the leading example introduced by Crawford and
Sobel, the uniform quadratic case, in which US (d; y) =   (d  (y + b))2 and UR (d; y) =
  (d  y)2 with y 2 [0; 1] being the state variable that is known to S only, d 2 [0; 1] the
decision that is taken by R. The parameter b > 0 captures the di¤erence in preference
between S and R. Its exogenously specied value determines the maximum number of
intervals (ranks) in the communication strategy of S, and, for a given N , the vector a (N). In
our model, the di¤erence in preference equals ^ (), where ^ () is determined in equilibrium.
This endogeneity may make that agents send relevant information about the state for any
nite . Indeed, proposition 4, part iv states that agents send relevant information about
the technologys values for any nite  in case they started out with di¤erent technologies
and markets are global.
This di¤erence is illustrated in Figure 4. Panel a shows the determination of the equilib-
rium value a1 in the uniform-quadratic case of Crawford and Sobel. For N = 2, the value of
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Figure 4: Determination of the partition in the communication strategy. Communication
limited to at most two ranks. Panel (a) shows the canonical uniform-quadratic case of
Crawford and Sobel. Panel (b) shows the case of centralized learning and global markets.
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2
  2b, see e.g. Gibbons (1992, p. 216). This equality can also be written as
b =
1
2

1
2
  a1

. (13)
The LHS captures the di¤erence in preference alignment. It determines the equilibrium value
a1. The LHS (RHS) of (13) is plotted as a dotted (drawn) line in panel a. For the Sender
to send relevant information b < 1=4 must hold.
Panel b shows the determination of the equilibrium value a1 in case communication
between the agents and center is limited to at most two ranks and markets are global. With
at most two ranks, (11) reduces to30

4
1 + 
F (a1) (1  F (a1)) = E [Z]  a1. (14)
The dotted lines represent the LHS for various values of . The reputational gap, the source
of the di¤erence in preference alignment, depends on the equilibrium value a1 and equals
zero for a1 = 0. The drawn line graphs the RHS. The graphs illustrates that for any nite
, there is a unique a1 > 0. That is, for any nite weight  that the agent puts on his
reputation, the agent uses (at least) two ranks.
The key to understand why communication among agents and centre remains possible
for any nite  in case of global markets is the fact that the reputational gap equals zero
30See the proof of Proposition 4.
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for a1 = 0. If agents use di¤erent technologies and a1 = 0, the center decides on the
technology that is to be used in t = 2 by tossing a coin. As global markets know that
the initial distribution of technologies equaled Y; Z, the decision of the center does not add
any information on the relative values of the technologies nor on the ability of the agents.
Hence, ^1 (Y; Z; Y; Y ; a1 = 0) = ^1 (Y; Z; Z; Z; a1 = 0). Instead, with local markets, relevant
communication about the value of a technology is not possible for   locl as even for
a1 = 0 (i.e., one rank only) and yloS = 0 the reputational gap does not vanish but equals
42
(3+2)(1+)
.31 The reason is that a local market does not know whether agents initially used
the same technologies or di¤erent ones. If an agent is forced to change technology, the market
deduces that agents must initially have used di¤erent technologies and that next the center
tossed a coin. The deduced di¤erence in initial technology hurts an agents reputation. If
instead an agent must continue his initial technology this may also mean that both agents
initially used the same technology. The latter makes it more likely that the agents received
a correct signal. As a result, continuation boosts an agents reputation, and the reputational
gap continues to exist even for a1 = 0.
7 Welfare Comparisons
How does globalization a¤ect the quality of learning? An isolated agent can only learn from
his own past experience with a given technology. Globalization allows him to compare his
experience with that of others. Furthermore, globalization may make that local markets
become global. To understand the welfare consequences of these two forms of globalization,
we consider for each process the expected value of the technology that is in use at site 1 in
period 2, assuming that 1 starts with Y , E

Xi;2jsY ; ; 

. The expectation is taken over
y, and before 1 knows agent 2s technology in period 1, assuming of course equilibrium
behaviour. The theoretical maximum value is E [Y jy > z], which obtains if agent 1 chooses
the better technology in period 2 with probability one. No process generates this value, unless
 = 1 in which case the better technology is identied in t = 1. Absent perverse behaviour,
the theoretical minimum value is E [Y jy > z]+ (1  )E [Y ]. This is the expected value in
31For the derivation, see the proof of Proposition 4.
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case the technology adopted at site 1 in t = 2 equals the rst period choice with probability
one, independent of the experience gained with the technologies in t = 1 throughout the
economy.
To focus on di¤erences in value creation thanks to learning from own past behaviour and
from the experience of others, we transform E

Xi;2jsY ; ; 

using the following formula,
W (; ) =
E

Xi;2jsY ; ; 
  (E [Y jy > z] + (1  )E [Y ])
E [Y jy > z]  (E [Y jy > z] + (1  )E [Y ])  100%. (15)
That is, W (; ) 2 [0%; 100%] captures value creation thanks to learning, over and above
the minimum value, as a percentage of what is maximally attainable. We refer to it as
welfare.
7.1 Decentralized learning: welfare comparisons
In this subsection, we compare isolated agents with decentralized learning, and decentralized
learning cum local markets with decentralized learning cum global markets. A shift from local
markets to global markets could be the result of the IT revolution and increased information
dissemination over the WWW, or of societal pressures to increase transparency that allow
for comparisons across sites.
Key to welfare comparisons are (i) the information agents have, and (ii) the degree to
which they use it in the various situations. Consider (i). By denition, an isolated agent
only knows the value of his own technology, and does not know what technology has been
adopted at the other site. We know from Propositions 2 and 3 that in case of a decentralized
learning process for any  > 0 agent 1 in a global market also knows X2;1 (but not x2;1 if
X2;1 = Z), and that with local markets he knows both X2;1 and x2;1. If an agent does not
care about his reputation, additional information can only lead to an increase in welfare.
This implies that there is some 1 > 0 such that for all  2 (0; 1) additional information is
also welfare-enhancing: Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) < W
lo
dl (; ).
Consider (ii). Propositions 13 show that the degree to which information is used depends
on the strength of reputational concerns. In particular, they establish for the three cases the
values of  above which an agent ignores all information and simply continues with his initial
choice of technology. These values are ia = E [Z] =, 
lo
dl = 1=, and 
gl
dl = E [Z] (1 + ) =
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for an isolated agent, an agent under decentralization and local markets, and an agent under
decentralization and global markets, respectively. As ia < 
lo
dl;

gl
dl, an isolated agent stops
using information for a lower value of  than a decentralized agent.32 Furthermore, gldl < 
lo
dl
if and only if E [Z] (1 + ) < 1. If this inequality holds, the ordering for su¢ ciently high
values of ,  > 2 for some 2 > 0,33 is the same as for low values of : decentralization
and local markets leads to the highest project value, next comes decentralized learning with
global markets, and isolated agents perform the worst.
To understand the condition E [Z] (1 + ) < 1, it is important to realize that information
has two roles. On the one hand, additional information helps the agent in identifying the
better technology. In case of local markets, agent 1 knows the value of the other technology.
The di¤erence z y can be as large as 1. In case of global markets, agent 1 can only calculate
E [Z]  y. This di¤erence is at most E [Z]. Hence, ceteris paribus,  should be larger in case
of local markets than in case of global markets for any information about Z to be ignored and
for the agent to continue with Y . On the other hand, additional information helps themarket
in evaluating an agents ability. A global market knows that agents initially adopted di¤erent
technologies, whereas a local market does not. As a result, reputation-wise more is at stake
in a local market than in a global market. If agent 1 were to continue with Y , rather than
to switch to Z, independent of what he knows about Z, then the reputational gap equals 
with local markets and = (1 + ) <  with global markets. Hence, ceteris paribus,  should
be larger in case of global markets than in case of local markets for information about Z
to be ignored and for the agent to continue with Y . The inequality E [Z] (1 + ) < 1 holds
if it is su¢ ciently hard to identify the better technology, and if the unconditional expected
value of a technology is su¢ ciently low. In case of the uniform distribution or any other
symmetric distribution it holds as  < 1.
In Figure 5, we compare project value, measured by W , for decentralized learning with
local and global markets and for isolated agents under the assumption that the value of
technology X 2 fY; Zg is uniformly distributed, fX (x) = 1 on [0; 1], and that  = 12 . 34
Figure 5 illustrates a number of points. First, learning from ones own past behaviour
and from others potentially boosts welfare enormously. For  close to zero, an isolated agent
32Note that the 1 in 
lo
dl = 1= is the upperbound of the support of fX . The inequality therefore holds
30
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 =1 1.25 =1.5 1.75 =2
W
(%
)
λ¯ia λ¯
gl
dl λ¯
lo
dl
λ
W lodl :
W gldl :
Wia :
Figure 5: W (; ) for isolated agents and for decentralized learning with local and global
markets. fX = 1 and  = 1=2 such that ia = 1, 
gl
dl = 3=2, and 
lo
dl = 2.
who is of high ability with probability  = 1=2 and learns from his own experience only can
capture 60% of the increase in expected project value. Learning from others further increases
this percentage. Second, globalization, i.e., global rather than local markets, reduces the
positive e¤ect of learning from others. The main reason is that communication breaks
down when markets become global. Third, the relative performance does not change in .
Additional calculations (not reported here) show that this is true independent of the value
of . The following Proposition sums up.35
Proposition 5 For any fX and , there exists a 1 > 0 such that Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) <
W lodl (; ) for all  < 1. Furthermore, for any fX and  such that E [Z] (1 + ) < 1, there
exists a 2 > 0 such that Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) < W
lo
dl (; ) for all  > 2. If instead fX
and  satisfy 1 < E [Z] (1+), then there exists a 3 > 0 such that Wia (; ) < W lodl (; ) <
W gldl (; ) for  > 3. For fX = 1, the uniform distribution, Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) <
W lodl (; ) holds for all  and .
independent of the chosen support.
33By continuity, 2 < 
gl
dl.
34For fX = 1 and  = 1=2, E [Y jy > z] = 2=3 and E [Y jy > z] + (1  )E [Y ] = 7=12.
35If  2


gl
dl;

lo
dl

, thenWia (; ) =W
gl
dl (; ) = 0 < W
lo
dl (; ). If   
lo
dl, then,Wia (; ) =W
gl
dl (; ) =
W lodl (; ) = 0. These cases are ignored in Proposition 5.
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7.2 Centralized learning: welfare comparisons
In this subsection, we compare isolated agents with centralized learning, and centralized
learning cum local markets with centralized learning cum global markets. Propositions 1
and 4 allow us to compare welfare W in case of centralized learning and isolated agents.36
Proposition 6 For any fX and , there exists a 4 > 0 such thatWia (; ) < W locl (; ) ;W
gl
cl (; )
for all  2 (0; 4). Furthermore, for any fX and  there exists a 5 > 0 such that
Wia (; ) < W
lo
cl (; ) < W
gl
cl (; ) for all  > 5. In addition, for fX = 1, the uniform
distribution, Wia (; ) < W
gl
cl (; ) ;W
lo
cl (; ) holds for all  > 0 and .
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Figure 6: W (; ) for isolated agents and for centralized learning with local and global markets.
W (; ) in case of centralized learning is based on a partition strategy with at most two ranks.
fX = 1 and  = 1=2, such that ia = 1, 
lo
cl = 2
7
16
.
Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 6 for the uniform distribution and  = 1=2. We have
imposed that communication with the center is limited to at most two ranks in case agents
initially used di¤erent technologies. Clearly, if agents can learn from others welfare improves.
Because of our limitation to at most two ranks, the graph understates the benets for low
values of . In fact, for  = 0, agents would truthfully reveal their private information
and the performance of a centralized learning process would equal that of a decentralized
learning process. We then know from Figure 5 that W  86% rather than W  68% as
shown in the graph. Note that when markets become global the positive e¤ect of learning
36If   locl , then, Wia (; ) =W locl (; ) = 0. This case is ignored in Proposition 6.
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from others further increases, especially for high values of . This stems from the fact that
communication between agents and center remains inuential for any nite  in case of global
markets, whereas it dies out for high values of  in case of local markets.
7.3 What learning process is best for given markets?
The welfare comparisons in the previous two subsections show how a given learning process
fares under di¤erent degrees of market globalization. In this subsection we turn to the
complementary question, and analyse, for a given degree of globalization of markets, the
conditions that determine whether decentralization or centralization performs best.
If markets are local, the learning process that is best depends fundamentally on the
parameters of the model.37
Proposition 7 In case of local markets, there exists a 6 < 
lo
cl such that welfare W (; )
is higher with decentralized learning than with centralized learning for all  > 6 if and only if
1
E [Z]
>
(3 + 2) (1 + )
4
. (16)
If condition (16) is met, there are values of  such that under decentralization the tech-
nology adoption decision in t = 2 depends on the observed values y and z, whereas in a
centralized process, agents do not transmit useful information about their technologies. As
a result, expected welfare is higher in case of decentralized learning.
Note that (3 + 2) (1 + ) =4 > 2 for all . 1=E [Z] is the ratio of the upperbound of
the support and the expected value of the technology. Hence, the ratio should exceed 2 for
there to be values of  such that decentralization outperforms centralization for high values
of . The uniform distribution cannot meet this condition. Does this mean that welfare is
higher under centralization than under decentralization in case of the uniform distribution
for all  and ? The next proposition provides su¢ cient conditions on  and  such that
decentralization outperforms centralization.
37If   locl , then W lodl (; ) =W locl (; ). This case is ignored in Proposition 7.
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Proposition 8 Assume local markets and technology values that are uniformly distributed.
Then, for any  there are values of ,  2  () ;  (), with 0 <  () <  (), such that
welfare W (; ) is higher under decentralized learning than under centralized learning.
What learning process is best if markets are global?
Proposition 9 In case of global markets, and for any fX , , and , welfare W (; ) is
higher with centralized learning than with decentralized learning.
The main benet of moving from decentralization to centralization in case of global
markets is the restoration of communication when agents initially used di¤erent technologies.
The proof establishes that even if agents in a centralized learning process were to limit
themselves to a communication strategy consisting of at most two ranks - and choose a1
optimally - welfare goes up. This suggests that the welfare di¤erence can be substantial for
low values of , as such values allow for richer communication (i.e., ner partitions).
8 Concluding Remarks
An important objective of this paper was to gain insight into the e¤ects of alternative
learning processes on the quality of decisions in situations where information is dispersed
among agents, and agents are concerned about their reputations. Our analysis focuses on
two broad features of decision-making processes: the extent of centralization and whether
decision-makers operate in a local or global world. We believe that our focus enabled us
to derive a couple of interesting results. By focusing on these two broad features, we have
abstracted from other features of decision-making processes. Here we would like to elaborate
on some of the specic assumptions we have made.
Centralization. One important assumption is that in a centralized process the center
always acts in the general interest. In reality, there is little reason to put so much condence
in central bodies. For example, a center may be biased towards one of the technologies
because of favoritism. Alternatively, a center may be biased because somehow its name is
connected to one of the technologies. Of course, our assumption of a "benevolent" center
provides too favourable a picture of centralized processes.
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Information. We have described the private information that agents have as non-veriable,
and communication as cheap talk. Although this may well reect an important part of
information agents have gained locally, they may also have veriable information. Such
information can be checked by other agents. If it is unknown whether an agent actually
possesses information that is decision-relevant to another agent, the former may have an
incentive to selectively withhold his private information from the latter, see e.g. Milgrom
and Roberts (1986). How does the presence of veriable information change our ndings?
Although the nature of information manipulation changes, the incentives to manipulate
continue to be determined by the interplay of the decision rights and the knowledge the
markets have. As a result, the quality of information exchange depends in essentially the
same way on these same two factors. Consider decentralized decision-making with local
markets. The fact that an agents reputation is independent of what the other agent does
and that an agent can decide himself what technology he uses next makes that revealing
all positive and negative pieces of information is a weakly dominant strategy. With global
markets (and decentralised decision-making), it is important from a reputational perspective
to convince the other agent to switch to your technology. As a result, any negative
information will be withheld. The introduction of centralised decision-making in the presence
of global markets gives rise to the selective revelation of negative information. On the one
hand, as the agent at a site loses decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the
center is well-informed. On the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants
the center to impose his technology at either site. Ceteris paribus, the more damaging
negative information is for the technological value, the more likely it is that the information
is revealed. Similarly, the more damaging negative information is for his reputation, the less
likely it becomes that this information is revealed.
In our model, signals are for free. However, one can easily imagine situations where
agents can increase the probability of receiving an informative signal by putting more e¤ort
in investigating technologies. We consider modeling agentse¤ort decisions as a promising
extension of our model. We expect that reputational concerns do not only lead to distortions
in communication and decisions, but that they may also induce agents to put more e¤ort in
investigating technologies, see e.g. Suurmond et al. (2004).
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Decision rights. We have limited attention to centralization and decentralization. A
possible third organizational structure is a committee consisting of the two agents that makes
a collective decision in period 2 on the basis of some voting rule. Visser and Swank (2007)
analyze communication and voting in committees in the presence of reputational concerns.
Our approach is particularly relevant for situations where agents independently gained
experiences that are worth sharing. In our model, period 1 represents history. However, in
other situations experience still has to be gained. Then, some planner could opt for ignoring
signals and assign one technology to agent 1 and the other technology to agent 2. Such a
procedure is likely to weaken reputational concerns as the technology decisions are no longer
linked to signals. Moreover, it allows for learning in period 2. It is easy to show that assigning
technologies in period 1 is optimal if signals are not very informative. The rst-period costs
of ignoring signals are then small.
9 Appendix
We use the abbreviations ia, dl, cl, gl, and lo to refer to specic learning processes and degrees
of market globalization. Recall that FX
 
xjsX ;  = F (x)2, and FX  xjsX ;  = F (x).
Proof of lemma 1: Consider (1) in the text. (a) As Pr
 
jsY ; 0 = 0, E ZjsY ; 0 = E [Z].
Similarly, as Pr
 
jsY ; 1 = 1, then E ZjsY ; 1;  = E [Z], and therefore E ZjsY ; 1 = E [Z].
Moreover, E

ZjsY ; y;  < E [Z] for y 2 (0; 1), as the term on the LHS is the expected value
of the truncated distribution on [0; y). (b) To determine the derivative, use Bayesrule to
write Pr
 
jsY ; y = 2F (y)= (2F (y) + (1  )). Also, E ZjsY ; y;  = R y
0
tf (t) dt=F (y).
One can verify that @ Pr
 
jsY ; y =@y = Pr  jsY ; y  1  Pr  jsY ; y f(y)
F (y)
> 0, and that
@E

ZjsY ; y;  =@y =  y   E ZjsY ; y;  f(y)
F (y)
. Hence,
@E

ZjsY ; y =@y = Pr  jsY ; y f (y)
F (y)
 
y   E ZjsY ; y ,
from which it follows immediately that E

ZjsY ; y is decreasing for y < E ZjsY ; y and
increasing for y > E

ZjsY ; y. Hence, y = E ZjsY ; y has a unique solution. 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, ^ (Y Y ; t) = Pr
 
jY Y ; t in (2). Use Pr  Y Y j =
Pr
 
y  tj =2 =  1  F (t)2 =2 and Pr (Y Y j) = Pr (y  tj) =2 = (1  F (t)) =2, and
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apply Bayes rule (analogously for ^ (Y Z; t). Clearly, for given reputations the equilibrium
strategy is a single threshold strategy with yia satisfying (3). Given this strategy, equilibrium
reputations are as in (2) with t = yia. To see that y

ia is a decreasing function of  for   ia.
Dene  := yFBia  yia and^ := ^ (Y Y ) ^ (Y Z). Then (;^) 2 L := [0; E [Z]][0; 1], and
so L is a complete lattice. It follows from Lemma 1 that (3) can be written as  = f1 (^; ).
It follows from (3) that the function f1 satises @f1=@^; @f1=@ > 0, and from (2) that
^ = f2 () is an increasing function of . Hence, we can apply Theorem 3 in Milgrom and
Roberts (1994). The set of xed points of f : LR+ ! L is non-empty and equals the set of
equilibria, and  = yFBia   yia is increasing in . Moreover, in case this set is not a singleton,
both the highest and the lowest xed point are increasing in . It is straightforward to check
that for   ia, yia = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: The equilibrium belief functions follow immediately from the
equilibrium message strategies. That the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy
follows from the analysis preceding the statement of the proposition. Finally, note that for
tS = 0, the RHS of (4) equals E [Z], and therefore t

D = E [Z], and thus  = 
lo
dl. Finally, if
tS = 0 and t

D = 1, ^ (Y Y ; 0; 1) =  (as agent uses pooling strategy) and ^ (Y Z; 0; 1) = 0
(this is an out-of-equilibrium belief, the limit of ^ (Y Z) in case tD " 1) such that for   lodl,
the agents indeed continue with their initial technologies no matter what.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, the reputations. ^1 (Y Y Y Y ; c) = Pr
 
jY Y Y Y ; c. Write
F (c) = F . Use Pr
 
Y Y Y Y j = Pr  Y Y Y Y j; y > z =2 = (1 + ) Pr (y > cjy > z) =4 =
(1 + ) (1  F 2) =4 and Pr (Y Y Y Y j) = (1 + ) (1  F 2) =8 + (1  ) (1  F )2 =8, and so
^ (Y Y Y Y ; c) = (1 + F ) 1+
1+2+2F
 > . Similarly, ^ (Y Y ZZ; c) = F +1
1+(2F 2+). One
can check that ^ (S) := ^ (Y Y Y Y ; c)   ^ (Y Y ZZ; c) is decreasing in c. In particular,
for cS = 0, the gap equals
1+
1+2
. Also, ^1 (Y ZY Y ) = Pr
 
jY ZY Y . From fY; Z; Y; Y g
the market deduces that y > z in case of both rst-best and equilibrium behaviour. Thus,
Pr
 
Y ZY Y j = (1  ) =4 (as 2 =  for X2;1 = Z) and Pr (Y ZY Y j) = (1  ) =8, and ap-
ply Bayes rule. Finally, ^1 (Y ZY Z) = Pr
 
jY ZY Z. From fY; Z; Y; Zg the market deduces
that (y; z) 2 A := f(y; z) jy; z < cD or y; z > cDg. Use Pr
 
Y ZY Zj = 1 
2
Pr (Ajy > z) 1
2
,
Pr (Y ZY Zj) = 1
2
1 
2
Pr (Ajy > z) 1
2
+ 1
2
1+
2
Pr (Ajz > y) 1
2
, and Pr (Ajz > y) = Pr (Ajy > z)
(as Y and Z are iid), and apply Bayes rule. For given reputations and behaviour of 2, if
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y = cD, and if 1 continues Y he gets c

D+Pr (z < c

D) 2= (1 + )+Pr (z  cD)= (1 + ),
whereas switching to Z yields E [Z] + Pr (z < cD)= (1 + ). Equating these expressions,
one obtains (7). It is immediate that cD is a decreasing function of . The comparative stat-
ics result on cS uses Theorem 3 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994), see also proof of Proposition
1. The expressions for gldl and 
gl
dl are then immediate.
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume X1;1 6= X2;1, that the center uses (8), that reputa-
tions are given, and that agent 2 uses the partition strategy (N; a) to communicate
about Z. We show that it is then a best-reply for agent 1 to use a partition strategy
with the same partitions to communicate about Y . We focus on the case of lo, and write
^ (Y;X) instead of ^
 
Y;X; yloS ; a
. Derivations for the gl case are analogous. Let y = ar,
where we have suppressed reference to the number of partitions N . At this value of y, 1
should be indi¤erent between sending some mr+1 2 [ar; ar+1) or some mr 2 [ar 1; ar). If
z < ar 1 or z  ar+1, whether 1 sends mr or mr+1 does not a¤ect the decision of the cen-
ter. Hence, one can limit attention to z 2 [ar 1; ar+1). As E

ZjsY ; sZ ; y = ar

= E [Z],
E

ZjsY ; sZ ; y = ar;   z  

= E [Zj  z  ] for any pair (; ) such that 0   <
  1. Let p (; ) := F ()  F (). Sending mr+1 yields agent 1
p (ar 1; ar) [ar + ^1 (Y Y )] +
1
2
p (ar; ar+1) [ar + ^1 (Y Y )] + (17)
1
2
p (ar; ar+1) [E [Zjar  z < ar+1] + ^1 (Y Z)] ,
whereas mr yields
1
2
p (ar 1; ar) [ar + ^1 (Y Y )] +
1
2
p (ar 1; ar) [E [Zjar 1  z < ar] + ^1 (Y Z)] (18)
+p (ar; ar+1) [E [Zjar  z < ar+1] + ^1 (Y Z)] .
Equating (17) and (18) shows that agent 1 is indi¤erent between sending mr+1 and mr for
y = ar if (9) holds.
If X1;1 = X2;1 = Y , it is straightforward to check that, if agent 2 uses the collusion
strategy, if the centers decision strategy is as stated, and for given beliefs ^, then for agent 1
a collusion strategy with yloS satisfying (10) is a best-reply. It is straightforward to establish
that the belief function follows from applying Bayesrule to the communication strategies of
the agents, and that the centers decision strategy is a best reply given the belief function.
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Consider yloS = 0; a

1 (1) = 0 (a pooling communication strategy). To determine ^ (Y Y ) 
^ (Y Z), use Pr
 
Y Y j = Pr  Y Y j; y > z 1
2
+Pr
 
Y Y j; z > y 1
2
= 1
8
+ 3
8
, and Pr (Y Y j) =
3
8
. Hence, ^ (Y Y ) = 3+
3+2
. Similarly, ^ (Y Z) = 
+1
, such that ^ (Y Y )   ^ (Y Z) =
4
(3+2)(1+)
. The RHS of both (9) and (10) become E [Z]. Hence, this communication
strategy is indeed the equilibrium for   locl.
Now turn to gl. Assume X1;1 = X2;1 = Y . For given parameter values the collusion
strategy is the same as the cut-o¤ strategy in case of dl cum gl. Thus, ^

Y Y Y Y ; yglS = 0

=
(1 + F (0)) 1+
1+2+2F (0)
 =  (1 + ) = (1 + 2), and ^

Y Y ZZ; yglS = 0

= 0, and the RHS
of (12) becomes E [Z] for yglS = 0. Hence, this collusion strategy is indeed the equilibrium
strategy for   glcl.
Now assume X1;1 6= X2;1. Assume N = 2, and dene a := a1. ^1 (Y ZY Y ; a) =
Pr
 
jY ZY Y ; a. Use
Pr
 
Y ZY Y j; a = 1
2
1  
2

Pr (y > a > zjy > z) + Pr (y > z > ajy > z) 1
2
+ Pr (a > y > zjy > z) 1
2

=
1  
4

1
2
+ F (a) (1  F (a))

:
Similarly, Pr
 
Y ZY Y j; a = 1
8
 
4
F (a) (1  F (a)). Hence, ^1 (Y ZY Y ) = 1+
 
1 + 2F (a)  2F (a)2.
Analogously, ^1 (Y ZZZ) = 1+
 
1  2F (a) + 2F (a)2, and the reputational gap becomes
4 
1+
F (a) (1  F (a)). As  4
1+
F (0) (1  F (0)) = 0 < E [Z] and  4
1+
F (E (Z)) (1  F (E [Z])) >
0, for all continuous F and any nite  there is a unique a1 > 0 that satises (11). That is,
for any nite , N  2.
Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose  = 0. Then, Wia (0; ) is equal to W (0; ) in case
one agent reports to the center that y  yFBia or y < yFBia . In case of cl, two agents
reveal information truthfully to the center. By continuity of Wia (; ) and Wcl (; ) in ,
Wia (; ) < Wcl (; ) for all  < 4, for some 4 > 0. The second part of the proposition
follows from the facts that (i) locl > ia (see Propositions 1 and 4), and (ii) for all  agents send
inuential information under cl cum gl. The truth of the nal statement in the proposition
has been veried numerically.
Proof of Proposition 7: It follows from Propositions 2 and 4 that lodl > 
lo
cl i¤ (16) holds.
The existence of 6 then follows from the continuity of W in .
Proof of Proposition 8: Consider cl, and supposeN = 3. We knowE [Zj0 = a0  z  a2] 
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a1 = E [Zja1  z  a3 = 1]   a2 from (9). If two becomes the maximum number of ranks,
then a1 = 0, and so this equality becomes E [Zj0  z  a2] = E [Z]   a2. For any fX , let
a2 < E [Z] denote the unique value of a2 satisfying this equality. Let a

2=3 := (0; 0; a

2; 1).
Hence, (9) and (10) become 
h
^

Y Y ; yloS ; a

2=3

  ^

Y Z; yloS ; a

2=3
i
= E [Z]   a2 and
E

ZjsY ; sY ; yloS
  yloS = E [Z]  a2. There is a unique yloS () that satises the latter equal-
ity. We can then use 
h
^

Y Y ; yloS () ; a

2=3

  ^

Y Z; yloS () ; a

2=3
i
= E [Z]   a2 to nd
 (). For    (), agents use at most two ranks.  () is obtained from our numerical
simulations. We checked the statement for  2 [0:05; 0:95].
Proof of Proposition 9: Fix , ; and fX . Suppose X1;1 = X2;1. A straightforward
comparison of (6) and (12) shows that welfare is the same under dl and cl for all fX , , and
. Now suppose X1;1 6= X2;1. In case of cl and in equilibrium, the more ranks the agents
use, the higher isW . Hence, it su¢ ces to show that the proposition is true if communication
under cl is limited to two ranks. Proposition 4 (iv) shows that an equilibrium with two ranks
exists for all parameter values. This partition is characterized by a1 2 (0; E [Z]). Thus, if
agents rank their technologies di¤erently, the center picks the higher ranked technology.
Given the communication strategies of the agents this technology is indeed the better one.
However, for (y; z) 2 [0; a1]2 and (y; z) 2 [a1; 1]2, both technologies are ranked in the same
way. Hence, the center tosses a fair coin. The inferior technology is chosen half of the time
at both sites. In case of dl, for y < cD  z, the Y -user switches to Z, and the Z-user
continues his technology. Both agents use the superior technology in t = 2. The same
holds, mutatis mutandis, for z < cD  y. However, for (y; z) 2 [0; cD]2, both agents switch,
while if (y; z) 2 [cD; 1]2, both agents continue. In either case, the inferior technology is used
at one site with probability one. Clearly, if a1 = c

D, then cl and dl would yield the same
expected welfare. For given parameter values, they are, however, not the same. cD satises
 
1+
= E [Z]  cD (see (7)), whereas a1 satises  1+4F (a1) (1  F (a1)) = E [Z]  a1 (see
(14)). As 4F (a1) (1  F (a1)) < 1 for all a1, for given parameter values, the reputational
gap in case of cl is smaller than in case of dl. As this gap equals the size of the distortion,
E [Z]  a1 or E [Z]  cD, cl yields a higher expected welfare than dl.
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